Landowner Liability for Public Sidewalk Injuries

The defendant, Titan Enterprises, Inc., moves to strike count one of the plaintiff’s complaints which alleges that on August 17, 2023, he was caused to trip and fall over a wooden stake while walking on the “parking and/or walkway area” of the premises owned, possessed, managed, maintained, and/or controlled by Titan. The plaintiff alleges that the Titan knew or should have known that the area where he fell was in disrepair and there was a wooden stake on the premises.

Landowner Liability for Injuries on Abutting Public Sidewalk

Based on the plaintiff’s complaint, it is unclear what relationship, if any, existed between Titan and the co-defendant, the city of New Haven. However, in its motion to strike, Titan argues that the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is against the city of New Haven under Connecticut General Statutes § 13a-149, which makes the city’s duty to maintain public roads and sidewalks nondelegable. Titan further argues that because the plaintiff’s fall is alleged to have occurred on a public sidewalk, a claim under § 13a-149 is his only remedy. Moreover, because the duty under § 13a-149 is nondelegable, Titan argues that a nonmunicipal entity, like itself, cannot be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff contends that neither the language of § 13-149 nor the case law cited by Titan prohibits him from bringing a claim for negligence against the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff cites cases in which the Appellate Court allowed negligence claims to proceed against an abutting landowner when a plaintiff is injured on a public sidewalk.

Court Denies Motion to Strike Negligence Claim Against Nonmunicipal Entity

The court holds that based on the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, Titan failed to meet its burden to establish that count one is legally insufficient. Both parties cite relevant case law, but no appellate case addresses the issue of whether nonmunicipal entities can be held liable for injuries that are potentially attributable to the purview of the highway defect statute. The court further states that the facts of this case have yet to be fully developed as to whether the claim is properly considered a highway defect claim. The plaintiff simply alleges that he was lawfully on the premises owned, possessed, managed, maintained, and/or controlled by Titan. Discovery should therefore focus on this issue. For these reasons, the court concludes that the plaintiff has alleged a legally sufficient cause of action upon which relief can be granted under Connecticut common law. Accordingly, the court denies Titan’s motion to strike count one. Armstrong v. Titan Enterprises, Inc., No. UWY-CV-24-6078096-S, 2025 WL 88252 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2025)