Motor Vehicle Law: Court declines to award double or treble damages in motor vehicle tort action due to plaintiff’s failure to present sufficient evidence supporting a claim for recklessness

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident wherein he was a passenger in the vehicle owned and operated by the defendant. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged negligence in the first count, common law recklessness in the second count, and statutory recklessness pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 14-295 in the third count. After defendant failed to appear in the matter, judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The only remaining issue for the court to resolve was damages. Based on the court’s review of the evidence, the court found that the plaintiff proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he sustained economic damages as a result of the motor vehicle accident.

As to common law recklessness, the trial court noted that the Supreme Court gives clear direction and provides that “[i]n order to establish that the defendants’ conduct was … reckless, … the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts … It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action … [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.” Elliott v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415 (1998). In this case, the plaintiff stated that the defendant used his turn signal, was aggressively changing lanes, and was “most likely going fast” but did not provide evidence that the defendant’s actions involved unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger was apparent. Therefore, the court does not find that the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to punitive or exemplary damages based on common law recklessness.

The court also analyzes the plaintiffs claim of statutory recklessness under Connecticut General Statute § 14-295. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was reckless in operating a vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and/or operating the vehicle in a reckless manner, in that he drove at a high rate of speed and entirely out of control. Section 14-295 provides that “[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury … the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a … and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury.” The statute provides that an award of double damages is appropriate when the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the statutes enumerated therein. The statute incorporates standards that have been long recognized by common law. The plaintiff here, in support of his statutory recklessness claim, provided that the defendant was aggressively changing lanes and was on his cell phone at the time of the accident. However, the plaintiff also stated that the driver turned on his signal to switch lanes and that the impact was not that big, but he felt it because “we were most likely going fast.” Other than this, the plaintiff provided no evidence of the speed of the vehicle or that the driver was traveling unreasonably fast. For these reasons, the court does not find that the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295. Therefore, the plaintiff is unable to recover on his claims for common law recklessness and statutory recklessness. Pope V. Waiters, No. UWY-CV-22-6067154-S, 2024 WL 3580558 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 26, 2024)