Premises Liability: Appellate Court refuses to extend liability to a nonowner and nonkeeper of a…
Premises Liability / CT Court Grants Summary Judgment Under Ongoing Storm Doctrine

Premises Liability: Because plaintiff’s objection was based on mere speculation and conjecture, court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to the ongoing storm doctrine:
The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it owed the plaintiff no duty of care for the injuries she sustained as a result of her slip and fall on ice at the defendant’s premises. In particular, the defendant argues that the ongoing storm doctrine shields the defendant from liability. In her objection, the plaintiff contends that there is an issue of fact as to whether there was an ongoing storm or a paused storm, and whether it was new or old ice that caused her to fall. The Supreme Court in Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 558 A.2d 240 (1989), established the concept of the ongoing storm under Connecticut law and provided that “in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and steps.” The Connecticut Appellate Court in Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC, 207 Conn. App. 119, 129, 261 A.3d 1 (2021), expanded on Kraus and set forth the burden-shifting framework on a motion for summary judgment when the defendant claims there is an ongoing storm at the time of the incident. In Belevich, the Appellate Court provided that “the defendant ha[s] to establish, prima facie, that it neither created the snow and ice condition nor had actual or constructive notice of the condition. . . . [T]he defendant [may sustain] this burden by presenting evidence that there was a storm in progress when the plaintiff fell.” The court in Belevich, having found the defendant sustained its burden, shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show that the “fall was caused by a slippery condition that existed prior to the ongoing storm and whether the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly preexisting condition.” In the present case, the court reviews the evidence submitted in support of the defendant’s motion, namely, the affidavit of its meteorologist who opined that there was black ice present on the subject steps on the morning of the subject incident and that such ice would have formed as a result of an ongoing storm, specifically rain, snow and sleet that occurred in the early morning of the subject incident. As such, the court finds that the defendant met its initial burden and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the fall was caused by a slippery condition that existed prior to the ongoing storm. The plaintiff submits a report from her expert meteorologist, who concluded that light, mixed precipitation—including snow, rain, and possibly sleet—fell from roughly 2:33 a.m. through 8:21 a.m. While the plaintiff’s meteorologist does not dispute there was an ongoing storm, he concludes that, based on the temperature and the amount of precipitation, “the probability of new ice forming that morning and/or enough snow and/or sleet accumulating to cause someone to fall [was] at 50%.” In the court’s opinion, the plaintiff fails to raise an issue of fact as to whether the storm created the ice that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s fall. The plaintiff’s meteorologist’s report speculates about whether ice formed on a prior date. Statements of fact based on mere speculation or conjecture are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and the plaintiff presents no evidence to establish that ice at the subject location existed prior to the incident. Because the defendant met its initial burden and the plaintiff failed to sustain her burden, the court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to the ongoing storm doctrine. Gallardo v. Cash 4 Keys NY, LLC, Docket No. HHB-CV24-6090030-S, 2026 Conn. Super. LEXIS 703 (Super. Apr. 7, 2026).
