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MOTOR VEHICLE LAW: Superior Court denies motion to strike common-law and statutory recklessness counts were plaintiff alleges conscious choice of conduct

The defendant moved to strike the common-law recklessness and statutory recklessness counts of the plaintiff’s complaint.  The Hartford Superior Court denied the motion to strike, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged common-law and statutory recklessness.  As to the common-law recklessness count, the court held that the allegations were sufficient where the plaintiff pleads the defendant “chose to consciously drive through the stop sign without stopping”, “consciously chose to attempt a quick dangerous left turn into plaintiff’s vehicle”, and “the conduct of the defendant as described herein indicates a conscious disregard of the rights and/or safety of the Plaintiff and was reckless.”  In regards to the statutory recklessness count pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295, the court holds in line with the majority view of Superior Courts that all a plaintiff has to allege is that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes and the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries and losses.  Michael Ryan v. Alyce V. Tedesco, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV20-6052781-S (June 19, 2020)