MOTOR VEHICLE LAW: Trial Court denies Motion to Strike statutory recklessness count, finding jury could find recklessness based on conduct alleged

The trial court denied defendant’s Motion to Strike the statutory recklessness count in a rear-end collision.  The court followed majority view that a claim for statutory recklessness is sufficient as long as it alleges that “the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the statutes enumerated in § 14-295, and further asserts that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.”  Under this this view, the court does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of pleading facts “that constitute a violation of one or more of the enumerate statutes.”  The alleged “that the defendant violated General Statutes §§ 14-240a and 14-218(a) when she ‘deliberately and with reckless disregard operated her motor vehicle too fast for driving conditions and too close to the Plaintiff’s vehicle; she intentionally chose to ignore the traffic conditions and elected to travel at a substantial rate of speed in excess of what was reasonable.’”  The plaintiff alleged that “the defendant, acting out of impatience brought on by having to wait for a significant period of time for an opening in heavy traffic, accelerated quickly notwithstanding ‘the dangerousness of the intersection.’”  The court held that a jury could find that the conduct alleged “reflects a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action.”  Frank Rinaldi v. Marion Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-20-6020938 (Oct. 26, 2020)